Introduction
France is no longer a statist political economy; but what sort of political economy is it?
In this chapter I show how the major institutions of the French economy have changed since 1985 and consider the character of the current political economy in light of the key actors in this process of change. Many scholars argue that the limits of statism were abundantly clear after the failure of François Mitterrand's experiment with "Keynesianism in one country" in 1983, but the analysis in this chapter shows that the withdrawal of the state from the economy was only consummated in the 1990s. The period between the mid-1980s and 1990 saw French governments attempt to empower various actors in civil society, especially employers and unions (Howell 1992 , Schmidt 1996 , Levy 1999 . These initial policies, which attempted to develop a coherent model for the post-statist political economy, set in motion a process in which national politicians and bureaucrats exercised ever decreasing influence over the choices of companies and individuals. State signals still matter in the French economy, as they do in all the advanced capitalist countries. The 1990s, though, witnessed the transformation of that economy largely through the uncoordinated action of individual economic actors, in a process made possible by policy choices but neither directed nor fully anticipated by governments. Markets and market power now set expectations in a wide array of fields, while French governments on the left and the right continue to assert their distaste for the market society. This uneasy tension between market reality and state discourse may partially account for the well of public discontent in the contemporary French polity.
The 1990s was a period of turbulent economic change for all the major industrialized economies, one characterized by the growing role of financial markets and the use of information technology across all sectors of the economy. I accordingly embed this discussion of economic change in France in a comparative perspective by drawing on insights from the varieties of capitalism literature, which holds that different advanced economies rely on systematically different means of coordinating the expectations of economic actors, especially those of business firms (Hall and Soskice 2001) . Firms in all political economies must develop relationships with their employees, their suppliers and collaborators, and with public actors. These economic relationships pose a variety of problems of coordination, and firms in different sorts of political economies rely on different sorts of institutions to overcome these problems of coordination. In liberal market economies (LMEs), firms rely primarily on the familiar institutions of the market economy: arms-lengths contractual relationships among companies, stock market systems of finance, company or individual-level wage bargaining, and an educational system premised on individual investments in general skills. The United Kingdom and the United States are the exemplars of this model. By way of contrast, firms in coordinated market economies (CMEs) rely to a much greater extent than do those in LMEs on mechanisms of non-market coordination: extensive inter-company relational contracting, strategic shareholding that provides patient capital, powerful and autonomous associations of capital and labor that regulate wages and other company policies, and educational systems that create the conditions for shared investment in specific skill-sets. Germany and the rest of northern Europe, along with Japan, approximate to this model.
France has never fit easily into the conceptual dichotomy between CMEs and LMEs, and its institutions circa 2005 continue to elude easy categorization. Yet the analytical strength of the varieties of capitalism approach lies not so much in its typologies as in its focus on problems of coordination and economic change.
1 This approach draws attention to those mechanisms that allow actors to predict how other actors will respond to political, economic, or technical changes. Knowing the likely response of other actors to an exogenous shock to the economy helps actors, in game theoretic terms, understand the game they are playing and to predict the payoffs associated with different courses of action. The functioning of financial, labor, and product markets depends crucially on how the participants in these markets predict what other market participants will do. Their inability to coordinate their expectations 1 It is for this reason-the micro-foundational logic based on problems of coordination-that I adopt the varieties of capitalism framework to analyze France. Other analytical frameworks, such as that of Bruno Amable (2003) or Vivien Schmidt (2002) , offer typologies into which France fits somewhat better than it does in the CME/LME distinction of Hall and Soskice. Yet as the rest of this chapter makes clear, the focus on coordination underscores that France also fits uneasily into the "continental European capitalism" of Amable or, a fortiori, the "state-enhanced" capitalism of Schmidt. The questions are central to the politics of economic change. Yet they are not always central to the way political scientists study economic change, because many political scientists take as axiomatic that institutional change must be ratified by public policy. Legislative arenas and outcomes are of course fundamental to democratic capitalism. However, politics encompasses private negotiations that influence, and are influenced by, the prevailing rules of the game in an economy.
Governments are not free to set these rules at will; they emerge from a history of private and public interaction. When effective institutions depend on informal practices rather than formal laws-when the law periodically races to catch up to current practice, rather than dictating that practice-then it may not be in legislatures or elections that the politics of institutional adjustment plays out. This was certainly the case of the radical changes that took place in the French financial system during the 1990s. While French governments made important policies that attempted to shape institutions of industrial relations and education, the incremental changes that we observe in those institutions in the end resulted less from public policy than from the choices of, and negotiations among, private actors.
To sustain these claims this chapter proceeds in the following way. Section one reviews the statist model as it existed circa 1985, focusing on the major sub-systems of the economy emphasized in the varieties of capitalism framework: finance and corporate governance, industrial relations, and vocational education and training.
Section two reviews the major changes in each of these sub-systems after 1990, along with the shifting balance in economic governance among state, market, and civil society entailed by these changes. The final section concludes with a discussion of how we should characterize the current French political economy.
The Statist Model
To understand the extent to which the French political economy changed between 1985 and 2005, it is important to know where it started. At least until the early 1980s, the principal elements of the statist model of economic governance worked together in a way that was characteristic neither of LMEs nor of CMEs. 2 This section outlines that model in ideal-typical form by considering three principal sub-systems of the political economy highlighted in the explanatory framework of varieties of capitalism: the system of finance and corporate governance, by which companies raise capital and owners monitor (or not) the performance of managers; the system of industrial relations that organizes relationships between employers and employees, both within firms and across entire sectors of the economy; and the system of education and training, which determines the sorts of skill sets on which employers will be able to draw for their production. The real bite behind the economic plans, which retained its sharpness even after planning declined in the 1970s, was state leverage over the way in which banks allocated their long-term credit. As argued by John Zysman (1983: 130) , "the French financial system [was] a credit based system with administered pricing." Through its mechanisms for the allocation of credit, the French treasury-the heart of the French bureaucratic elite-was for much of the postwar period capable of directing a substantial portion of the flows of capital for investment purposes. As access to finance was administered, so corporate governance was tied closely to the state apparatus, as top managers were recruited from the ranks of state bureaucratic elites (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot 1997). Thus, public influence over the managers at the towering heights of the French economy was secured both by controlling many of the available funds for investment and by the fact that most of these managers came out of the state bureaucratic corps in the first place.
In the second core institution of the economy-the system of industrial relations-public officials were the dominant actors in a field of weak employers' associations and even weaker unions. 4 In the early postwar years government had intervened in industrial relations so as to promote economic growth, with little attempt to involve organized labor in the implementation of this growth strategy. As the economy modernized, though, and especially after the crisis of 1968, the government moved increasingly to incorporate organized labor into a pattern of collective bargaining, if only to prevent labor strife from destabilizing the republic or retarding economic growth (Howell 1992) . Even the attempt to construct a system based on collective negotiations among unions and employers still led fundamentally to a system in which the state was the preeminent actor, as reflected in three of the prominent features of the statist institutions of industrial relations. First, given its large ownership stake in the economy, the state was a significant employer, and its negotiations with its employees set standards that influenced private sector negotiations. Second, the minimum wage after 1970 became an increasingly important tool of policy-makers to influence wage levels (Howell 1992: 107-110) . The third policy tool of statist regulation was the extension procedure, which allowed the government to extend agreements reached with one union to workers in an entire sector (Traxler et al. 2001: 182-3) . Over time, low and falling rates of union density The end result of these measures was a skill provision system that was financed by the state and provided by the public school system. From public financing flowed state influence over the educational tracks chosen. By way of contrast, Germany provided for massive private funding of firm-based training through its dual apprenticeship system, as employers paid the costs of in-firm training. Since company participation in German vocational training was voluntary, it was firms themselves that determined the exact composition of the skills certifications taught. In a system such as the American one, which like the French system was overwhelmingly school-based, much of the tertiary education provided was partially privately funded, through parental investment and student loans. In this system, students carried some of the credit risk of their investment in their own human capital, and their choices influenced the available degree programs. In international comparison, then, a notable specificity of the French system of education and training was to concentrate control exclusively in public hands. 5 In education as in industrial relations and finance, the statist model functioned on the basis of clear public signals around which private actors could reliably coordinate their expectations.
The Breakdown of the Statist Political Economy
By the year 2000, the French political economy had changed dramatically. The French government and bureaucracy could do no more to direct the course of adjustment in the political economy than governments of the other major industrialized countries. In this section I examine how the principal institutions of the statist political economy broke down between 1985 and 2000.
5 Even its attempt to provide firm-based training through the training tax-which was never widely successful and always concentrated on training already highly-skilled workers-was adopted in 1971 through a coercive state measure rather than voluntary participation by companies. Some have argued that the system of continuing training in France allows for its workers to catch up on the skills possessed by their German shopfloor counterparts (e.g., Géhin and Méhaut 1993). Econometric results from a study conducted by researchers at the LEST are eloquent on this point, though, showing that continuing training in France functions essentially as a selection mechanism: in other words, "continuing vocational training would not remedy lacunae in professionalism or increase individual productive capacity, but would do nothing other than demonstrate a skills advantage that is already observed" (Béret et al. 1997: 122-123) .
Finance and Corporate Governance
In the areas of corporate governance and finance, the statist model is dead. The rightist government of Jacques Chirac, elected in 1986, privatized 13 large groups, However, the state levers of control that had worked in the past were no longer available by the mid-1990s, had ministers or bureaucrats wanted to use them. Control over credit allocation was a distant memory, as French firms turned increasingly to equity markets. As demonstrated in the table below, existing French companies used equity markets heavily throughout the 1990s to raise money; in this respect, they acted more like companies in the American liberal market economy than companies in the German coordinated market economy. 
Industrial Relations
In the sphere of industrial relations, firm-level negotiation has vastly increased in importance since 1985. Public policy has not so much driven this change as it has provided the toolkit that companies have used to reorganize production (cf. Hancké 2002). In the early 1980s, wage agreements which covered entire sectors provided the minimum threshold below which wages and other working conditions could not fall.
Yet, as argued by Michel Lallement in this volume, a set of legal exemptions first 6 It is true that these changes of the French system of finance and corporate governance could not have taken place without the deregulation of French financial markets by the Chirac government in 1987 (Schmidt 1996: 140-1) . In this narrow sense, public action was a necessary condition for the changes in cross-shareholding that occurred one decade later. However, the adoption of the legal framework for deregulation explains neither the timing of the breakdown of French cross-shareholding arrangements, nor the fact that similar legal deregulation did not lead to the breakdown of patient capital in Italy and Germany during this time (Culpepper 2005) . The hallmark of the modern system of French industrial relations is negotiation, rather than either conflict (through strikes) or governmental control (through detailed regulation). It is clear that the market is not the principal mechanism to which economic actors look for their signals of likely outcomes. But neither do they look primarily to the state. Instead, the French model of industrial relations appears increasingly oriented to outcomes that are negotiated and debated at the level of the firm rather than the sector. This trend is likely to continue, and its continuation will highlight the contradictions between the traditional republican commitment to equality and an increasing diversity of situations at the level of the firm.
Education and Training
The French system of education and training reveals clearly how decentralized decisions by uncoordinated economic actors have undermined the mechanisms of statist coordination without being able to replace them. In youth vocational training, regional councils have taken over state competencies while being even less capable than the national state of imposing effective coordination. As a result, their policies are largely ignored by individual companies, who use the vocational system primarily to finance firm-specific training with public subsidies (Culpepper 2003) . At the level of elite production, meanwhile, student choice has shifted toward earlier departure from the grand corps to lucrative private sector careers. The ENA may now be France's best business school, handsomely underwritten by the government (cf. Bauer and BertinMourot 1997). At both ends of the education system-that is, the aspects in which no longer equates to state coordination.
The most important reform of the system of education and training in the 1990s was the delegation of the nominal right to coordinate all youth professional training measures to the regional councils in the Five Year Law of 1993 (henceforth the FYL). 12 This law and its enabling legislation were the culmination of a decade during which national governments had repeatedly attempted to draw regional councils and social partners into the governance of education and training institutions. The FYL specified a set of jointly managed institutions within which employers and unions were to discuss the problems besetting local labor markets and to devise solutions for them.
The FYL not only attempted to effect a substantial increase in the degree of employer investment in the vocational training system, through the alternance contracts (apprenticeship and qualification contracts); it attempted to do so through an institutional mechanism that would invigorate social partnership at a regional level, mobilizing the private information necessary for regional councils to design policy that could respond effectively to the problems of local employers and trainees.
In its goal of increasing firm investment in alternance training, the reform 
1997: 17-18).
Where the 1993 reform of the FYL did succeed was in devolving the strategic task of setting priorities for youth professional education to the regional level (Lamanthe and Verdier 1999). However, as we have already seen, the legal institutions that were to enable the regions to assume this authority were incorrectly premised on the ability of labor unions and employers' associations to provide regional officials with information on the skill needs of the economy. There is little the regional councils could do to develop a closer articulation between the educational system and the economy without knowing what skills companies needed in the future. Moreover, the fact that large firms effectively controlled much of the certification process-which is still a national prerogative, both for diplomas and non-state certifications-further removed the regional councils from the core area for which they have the authority (but not the informational capacity) to set priorities. Regional councils lacked the tools to persuade the individual actors in training and education-companies and studentsthat their coordination generated meaningful signals to which those actors should respond. Priority-setting without effective mechanisms to support those priorities is a weak mandate indeed.
In the domain of vocational education and training, the FYL diluted the capacity of public actors to influence private actors. The architecture of the law was to accord the social partners at regional level greater input into the skill provision system. This was an attempt by the French government to increase the role of civil society in authoritative decision-making. The collective actors of civil society-in this case, employers' associations and trade unions-were unable to play this role. The weakening of the state opened a greater space for the market, as some regions have tried to make the market the axis of their new policies. 13 Thus, in this policy area, the 1990s have seen a decreasing role for the state, and an increasing role both for firms and for market signals more generally.
The vocational education and training system is part of a national system that provides employers with skills. A particularly French element of this system used to be the production of elites for the state bureaucracy, an important employer in the statist system. During the 1990s, this high end of the training and education system saw an important change in the choices of the highest-achieving French students, who appear to respond increasingly to attractions of the private sector. This is not a wider trend French education ministry in earlier years had minimized the responsiveness of that system either to skills demanded on the labor market or to the demands of organized employers. As long as employers were able to absorb semi-and unskilled workers into their production processes, the educational bureaucracy was able to maintain its control of the system. With the rising importance of vocational training in France (Béret et al. 1997 ) has come the recognition by government officials that they cannot effectively manage the development of this system from the center. As a result, it has become more subject to the demands of the market and of the specific demands of large firms.
At the other end of the educational spectrum, as long as the prestige and perquisites of civil service were able to attract the brightest young elites into bureaucratic careers, the state-controlled system was able to set the criteria of elite recruitment. Although the data are not definitive, the growing attraction of private sector careers appears to have reduced the capacity of the French statist model to select the best and the brightest. At both ends of the educational system, of course, state financing is still extensive; and in the broad middle-the system of general and 15 The Inspection des Finances is very small, recruiting on average only five students per year from the finishing ENA class. Thus, 33 early leavers in a decade means that a number equivalent to sixty percent of the total new recruits left for the private sector. A study conducted for the government in 2003 found that graduates of Polytechnique (X), the other summit of the French grandes écoles, had even more departures for the private sector than did those from ENA (Thibault de Silguy 2003: 47a) . See also Domart (2003) .
university education-the state still reigns supreme. Yet there is nothing unique about governments' providing and controlling basic education systems; governments do that in every advanced industrial country. The specificity of the statist model of education and training-controlling curricular development at all levels and ensuring the meritocratic selection of the highest elites to serve the state apparatus-was severely attenuated in the 1990s.
The Role of the State and of the European Union in Economic Change
Each of the three sub-systems of the French political economy experienced dramatic change after 1990. In none of these sub-systems did government policies determine the outcome of these changes. It is difficult to sustain the claim that France remains a 
Is there a French Variety of Capitalism?
In creating the conditions for France to be a competitive economy at the heart of the European Union, French policy-makers have discovered that the widening ambit of markets makes the task of directing economic development exponentially more difficult. As market governance penetrates more aspects of the French economy, many individual actors look to those markets for information about the likely behavior of others. The market is a better source of such information than the state, and individual actors know that. Yet the reach of the free market in France is hobbled by its discursive illegitimacy (Schmidt 2002: 271-287) . Thus, there is widespread resistance to accepting the market as the central source of information about mutual expectations.
Rather than the emergence of a new French system of coordination for the political economy, the process of change in the 1990s reveals a negotiated bricolage: a general move to the firm-level combined with a greater role for the market overlaid on an abiding belief that social negotiation, not market regulation, is the heart of the French economy. This bricolage is built on the wreckage of failed projects of coherent transformation attempted by governments in the 1980s (Howell 1992 , Levy 1999 .
France clearly lacks the infrastructure of strong associations of employers and labor to support a CME-style system of non-market coordination. In coordinated market economies, employers' associations and unions pool the power of weaker individual actors with stronger ones to negotiate the course of economic adjustment.
Lacking associations with these strengths, the French political economy has seen the strongest individual employers (large firms) and the strongest individuals (public elites and managers) rely increasingly on their individual market power to improve their own It is a truism of economics that markets do not like uncertainty. The varieties of capitalism approach, which puts the firm at the center of its analytical attention, correctly suggests that firms will try to reduce this uncertainty to maximize their efficiency. But politics often creates uncertainty, and the politics of economic change in France has created a system that, at the moment, lacks a coherent way of coordinating expectations among actors. It would be a functionalist fallacy to believe that France will necessarily evolve an optimal set of institutions for coordinating the suggests that the shape of the French political economy will be determined by negotiations among social actors, more at the firm-level than in parliament. Its evolution will be negotiated and, in the medium-term, somewhat incoherent. But incoherence is sometimes the tribute that economics must pay to politics.
